The Regularization and Optimal Design of All-Pay Auctions [ssrn]
-- develops a regularization procedure that yields unique closed-form equilibria in two-bidder all-pay auctions and characterizes optimal joint favoritism and information disclosure.
Pengcheng Bai
I am a third-year PhD student in Operations Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University. I received my MSc degree from Nanjing University.
More broadly, my research aims to use carefully chosen models to isolate economically meaningful mechanisms and deepen our understanding of real-world phenomena.
My research interests include market design, information design, socially responsible operations, and learning in dynamic markets.
Contact
Pengcheng Bai
Working Paper
Work in Progress
Serving an Aging Society: Targeted or Universal Subsidies for Community Food Centers?
Algorithmic Pricing Competition under Nonstationary Demand
Convex-Order Bounds and Joint Design in Two-Player Contests
-- studies design and performance bounds in asymmetric two-player contests.
Biased All-pay Auctions
-- studies how favoritism and information disclosure interact in all-pay auctions.
Black-Box Algorithm on Platforms
-- studies how platform algorithms affect seller learning and operational decisions.